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ABSTRACT.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify and evaluate the influence of geography and language on analytic philosophy. This clarification and evaluation, it is envisaged will introduce that philosophical language in which fundamental philosophical problems could be resolved or dismissed through the application of a rigorous and logico linguistic science. The philosophical outcome here will provide us with a precise account of vagueness such that the field of vagueness itself is then accurately expunged. This is unlike continental philosophy that does not see itself as abutting, or seeking to ground or support or complement, the world of modern scientific research. Continental philosophy is also dominated and characterized by the tradition of philosophizing in America, Britain, and Germany and France. The geo-linguistic conception considers geographic location and language as central to the nature and development of analytic philosophy. Its reputation (AP) and general acceptance is not only because it is ahistorical, but because it scrutinizes the status and purposes of demarcation between philosophical and methodological problems. Accounts of analytic philosophy often highlight the fact that the tradition grew to prominence as an opposition to continental philosophy and a rejection of Idealism. Analytic philosophy is marked by its focus on the question about the nature of language, meaning and thought and questions about how human mind relates to the world while continental philosophy focuses on questions about history, politics, freedom, desire, self and self-consciousness etc. This work therefore argues that analytic philosophy is more interested in conceptual questions and questions about the meaning of words, logical relations and statements. This made analytic tradition a phenomenal and a contemporary way of philosophizing that has been influenced steadily by its geo-linguistic connection. The paper further examines how Glock's exposition of geography and language influences Western Philosophy and continental Europe and how it brought new ways of thinking. Attempt is made to explicate how a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language which lead philosophers to exactness and a comprehensive account of thoughts. The work maintained that without analytic philosophy or the analytic method, complex philosophical issues will not be divided into simple parts and its exact meanings derived. The work concludes by highlighting the relevance of analytic philosophy to contemporary thinking and to philosophical problems in society.

Keywords: Geo-Linguistic influences, analytic-continental divide, and the relevance of analytic philosophy in society.

INTRODUCTION

The term analytic philosophy or otherwise conceived as analytical philosophy is 20th century movement in philosophy predominantly in Western philosophy, continental Europe (Britain, Germany, Austria etc) and Latin America, and Anglo-American academic philosophy. One central strand and focus of early analytic philosophy was the background of logical positivism, in which fundamentally there was consistent repudiation of metaphysical concepts or metaphysics. Analytic philosophy is a trend of contemporary philosophy with its own distinct methodology and content, originating in the works of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein . It was in the beginning of twentieth century philosophers like Moore and Russell started analytic philosophy in Great Britain while Frege's analytic tradition held sway in Germany in opposition to speculative idealistic philosophy. It has now we must know ramified into all areas of philosophy, transcending and diversifying in its methodology, ideas and basically its positions.

As a philosophical movement, it developed into a complex tradition that has made ground-breaking developments in Western and Continental Europe. It thrives to promoting analysis, scrutinizing and assessing concepts which are the core essence of philosophy, unlike continental philosophy that has been criticized as not being rigorous and non-analytical. For instance, continental philosophy focuses on historical events, politics, self and self-consciousness, freedom, desire and will.

Analytic philosophy is all about analysis of concepts, and systematic thought that underpins the formation of language by eliminating the classical metaphysical system (Chakraborty,2015:120). Chakraborty went further to argue that clarity and especially analysis are the stock in trade or well accepted tool that analytic philosophers leveraged on (2015:120). It is rich in language analysis and definition of terms in philosophy and explicitly distinct from other philosophies. This significantly implied that for any idea, proposition, theory or concept to stand as good philosophy its pros and cons must be scrutinized, concisely assessed, its terms clearly defined and vagueness removed. This is the stock in trade of analytic philosophy.

Due to its thrust and strong affinity with science and formal logic it was criticised and at the same time became an acceptable philosophical thought in Anglo-American, Anglo-Austrian Axis. Cooper stated that "Anglo-American analytic philosophy is more or less science-friendly than European philosophy. (Cooper, 1996:12). Von Wright saw the alliance of analytic philosophy with science and technology as a fantastic development and argued that analytic philosophy is an offspring of belief in progress in science (von Wright 1993: 25). Hacker (1996) and Critchley (1999:1-17) on the other hand, take anti-scientism as an essential feature of analytic philosophy and maintained that its anti-scientism characteristics distinguishes it from continental philosophy. Further progress was witnessed among individual philosophers who made veritable contributions to analytic philosophy.

Gottlob Frege, (1848-1951), was a renowned German mathematician, a great logician and a renowned thinker who was heralded as the founder of analytic philosophy. He gave analytic philosophy a penetrating start and excellent German background and made it distinct or broke away from the shackles of Absolute Idealisms while G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell articulated their alternatives to Idealism via linguistic idiom. Moore and Russell introduced the usefulness of definition of terms and weaved their arguments around the analysis of language, clarification of terms and propositions in solving philosophical problems.

During this period, idealistic philosophy (idealism) held sway to the extent that philosophers put little or no weight on precision in the formation of thesis or on the exact definition of the meaning of the terms they used. The quest for precision in the formation of thesis or the exact definition of meaning heralded the development of analytic philosophy in contrast with other philosophies during the early 20th century. Analytic tradition was heavily enmeshed with logical analysis of terms which helped the analysis of language towards the attainment of comprehensive thought. This method of analysis ultimately led Russell and others to think that artificial formal language is closer to reality than it is to ordinary language.

Frege in his analytic tradition justified the distinctions between analytic and continental philosophy in his book '*Conceptual Notation*' (Gottlob, 1972:105). Frege's philosophy of language to be exact has had a considerable, if not more, impact than his contributions to logic and mathematics. He argued that the terms of a language have both a sense and a denotation, i.e., that at least two semantic relations are needed to explain the significance or meaning of the terms of a language. The import of Frege's philosophy of language is that, a proper analysis of language will not only lead us to free philosophical thinking from inadequacies and imperfections but also help to derive clear meanings of philosophical programme.

He started by drawing a sharp divide between formal language and ordinary language. For him philosophical programme will be better done in a formal language which according to him is rich in logicist analysis of words. made in the new language such as those between identity, predication, existence and class-inclusion by means of metaphysical distinctions such as that between object and concept (Haaparanta, 2013: 4). This justification highlights Frege's major contributions to analytic tradition. The Vienna Circle maintained that the new logic, the ideal language developed by Frege, Russell, and Whitehead, frees philosophy from metaphysical considerations concerning the ultimate nature of reality.

Against this background, it is easy to understand why Frege sought to develop a formal language which was free from ambiguity and vagueness and expresses no more than was required for generating necessary inferences and which expressed this in a precise and perspicuous manner (Rein. 1985:314) In short, Frege's formal language was to lack all those features that could cause more problems in human thought system and our analysis of philosophical concepts. Frege's formal language construct was to ensure that all those features that stood in the way of precise and clear thinking are exterminated. Given that logic and philosophy cannot be isolated from each other, Frege used his formal language programme to provide a platform where philosophy will be free from inadequacies and unclearness. The essence of this movement in analytic philosophy from Frege's perspective is to avoid anything that will stand in the way of philosophy being an adequate medium for the execution of logicist programme which characterized philosophy.

Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was a remarkable British philosopher, logician, and a social critic who contributed greatly to the development of analytic philosophy in Britain. Together with G.E Moore, he was regarded as one of the main founders of modern analytic philosophy. His work on mathematical logic gave analytic philosophy a strong footing in Western philosophy. He was associated with the argument that it is the duty of philosophers to discover a logically ideal-language i.e. a language that will exhibit the nature of the word in such a way that we will not be misled by the accidental, imprecise surface structure of natural language. The ideal language in analytic philosophy is a language that epitomizes exactness, precision and free from ambiguity, clear in structure and rich in symbolic logic in contrast with ordinary language common with other philosophies. In his *theory of descriptions*, Russell without equivocation applied his logical theory to provide analysis of propositions in which particular things are described and given clarity. The world-view acceptance of analytic philosophy breeds from the pre-eminence given to logical analysis. Russell's contribution to the development of analytic philosophy influenced other philosophers to give analytic philosophy its logical background and perspective.

Russell's theory of descriptions greatly opened up the prospect of a whole new philosophical programme, making clear the real logical form of propositions to both reveal the fundamental structure and composition of the world and resolve philosophical perplexity that arises from misunderstanding the logic of our language and thought (Beaney, 2013: 6)

G. E. Moore (1873-1958) was among early analytic philosophers and one of the most critical aspects of Moore's philosophical developments was his break from idealism that dominated British philosophy and his defence of what he regarded as "Common Sense" from realism. He persuaded

Bertrand Russell against idealism and also initiated serious attack on all metaphysical theories that would invalidate the common sense belief of the non-philosophers. Meanwhile, his major contributions to philosophy were in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophical methodology and analytic philosophy.

The Viennese-born British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* (2012) saw the role of language as providing a strong picture of reality. Truth from this line of reasoning is seen as making logical proposition that correspond to reality. Ideal language is therefore fundamental and important to the extent that it is seen as a necessary criterion for understanding and determining the usefulness, the meaning or meaninglessness, of statement and proposition about reality or about the real world.

In summary, Russell's, Moore's and Wittgenstein's ideas all helped form what became known as the Cambridge School of Analysis, which reached the peak of its influence in the 1930s and in fact has continued to hold sway in English-speaking countries.

HANS-JOHANN GLOCK'S EVALUATION OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Hans-Johann Glock (2012) in his analysis of 'what is analytic philosophy' is concerned with what analytic philosophy is rather than where analytic philosophy originated from. Other philosophers may be interested in discussing where analytic philosophy comes from. But for Glock, the question about what is analytic philosophy is a fundamental question that needs philosophical answer. Again it is essential to provide answers to what is analytic philosophy so as to diffuse controversies soundings analytic tradition. This is important to those professional philosophers who termed analytic philosophy as unrewarding and to those who argued that we should dispense with labels like analytic philosophy. Glock therefore put his argument forward by saying that we "can hardly engage in an assessment of the historical development and the merits of analytic philosophy without some conception on what it amounts to (Glock 2012:9). He compared analytic philosophy with continental philosophy and Hegalian idealism which most analytic philosophers rejected and criticised as lacking in logic and clarification of language. Analytic philosophy according to him lacks historical awareness though it did not ignore the relevance of the past. In his analysis of *History and Historiography*, Glock does not intend to show any specific attitude towards history that gives a definition of analytic philosophy. Instead he was interested to prove that a specific attitude towards history is the correct one. (Glock 2008:89) One is persuaded to agree with Glock that it is important to keep a balance between history and analysis.

Further, he maintained that analytic philosophy concentrates on different topics, problems and doctrines different from continental philosophy. And since analytic philosophy takes into account the method of analysis, thus it provides a special way of philosophizing which is largely distinct from the continental or the earlier traditions. In all, Glock maintained that analytic philosophy excludes moral and political issues and concentrates on analysis of language, meaning of words, exactness and a comprehensive account of philosophical thoughts.

In this light, therefore, analytic philosophy is significantly the way to understand thought through the analysis of language. This therefore suggests that a philosophical account of thought can be achieved through a philosophical account of language. Dummett (1993:4) said that, analytic philosophy played a leading role and become a powerful tool for addressing philosophical problems. It does this by ensuring that the process through which comprehensive account of thought can be attained is done through the analysis of language. To analyse is to break something down into constituent parts. By this reference, analytic philosophy therefore is an attempt to clarify concepts, by analysing the meaning of statements and concepts. Although the detailed analysis of concept is not really the ultimate goal of philosophy, rather it should be an introductory step in well-ordered philosophy. This means that the ultimate end of philosophy is not only concerned with the detailed analysis of concepts in order to attain a comprehensive thought but also the grammatical form and the logical form.

From the foregoing, it can be argued that analytic philosophy is based on the notion that philosophical problems can be solved through an analysis of their terms or better still through pure systematic logic. Many philosophical problems are termed ambiguous, abstract or dismissed because their terms are vague and non-logical while others are subjected to a rigorous logical scrutiny. Philosophical problem like the question, 'Does God exist' has been answered by different philosophical schools. But analytic tradition did not evade the question rather it approached the question differently by first clarifying the terms and rephrasing the question: 'what do you mean by God or what figure is God made of. We do know that different religions have proposed answers on what God means. But under the purview of analytic philosophy it is essential to first define God and then proceed to explain under which terms God is defined. By so doing, ambiguity and vagueness in statements and propositions will be avoided. This is why analytic philosophy is more concerned with conceptual problems, analysis of language and clarification of terms. It is interested in questions about the meanings of words and statements and specifically their logical relations. It is not interested in spiritual or practical issues such as morality, or issues that pertain to the meaning of

the. Because of this thrust, analytic tradition is widely favoured for being dry and technical in all its ramifications.

Another elucidation made by Glock about analytic philosophy is that it relies heavily on vocabulary, assumptions and equations dominant in symbolic logic. It cut-across all major branches of philosophy such as social and political philosophy to metaphysics and logic. It is defined by its methods than by any set of questions, arguments or viewpoints. Its purported attitudes towards ethical and political questions differentiated it from other philosophies. Above all, analytic philosophy is best defined by its logical precision and clarification of its terms.

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY VERSUS NON-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

No doubt, a number of thinkers have addressed and tackled the task of tracing the divergence between analytic and continental philosophy. It is argued that these attempts have indeed captured the fundamental differences between the two traditions, but unfortunately has left the explanation of the divergences mysterious. Levy, for instance, argued that analytic tradition is usually seen as philosophy conducted within a paradigm, in Kuhn's sense of the word, whereas Continental philosophy assumes much less in the way of shared presuppositions, problems, methods and approaches (Levy 2003: 284).

Analytic tradition grew from a stew of ideas in philosophy, logic and mathematics especially in Britain and German-speaking Europe. Many of these ideas no doubt were naturally formulated, highly technical and thus intelligible only within the philosophical and scientific discourse on which they drew (Isaac 2019:1). Importantly, analytic philosophy has three germane elements that made it stand out among other philosophies. First, it is concern with the clarity of terms, second, the ability to subject every expressed view to rigorous critical evaluation and finally, the need for exhaustive discussion of every view expressed.

At the inception of analytic philosophy there were hot debates over who should be included in the analytic school and controversies over the original founders of modern analytic philosophy. This debate lingered between analytic philosophers and non-analytic philosophers (continental). A quantum look at the origin of analytic philosophy showed that analytic philosophy owes its roots to the works of G. Frege, L. Wittgenstein and R. Carnap while other works done by philosopher like Hans-Johann Glock, maintained that G. Frege and partly F. Brentano are the precursors of analytic philosophy.

First, analytic philosophy is reputed for its rejection of German idealism. Many have argued that analytic philosophy grew as a revolt against Kantian philosophy and Idealism and further developed as a form of opposition to neo-Hegelian metaphysics which was cultivated in England. The truthfulness of this claim is not far-fetched because analytic philosophy emergence in Western philosophy and continental Europe came to purge other philosophies the cobweb of weak structures, lack of clarity and precision and to introduce exactness, logic, and a comprehensive analysis of thoughts in philosophy. No wonder Moore and Russell rejected idealism and the method of neo-Hegelian metaphysics.

Moreover, the interface of analytic philosophy with geo-linguistic turn and the rich in logical and mathematical point of view did not just appear from the moon. It did well to harmonize the fact that the deep roots of analytic philosophy are in continental Europe, with its strong background in Frege, its opinion leader in Wittgenstein, the paradigmatic representatives of it, the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle were all from the continent. Its world-view acceptance coupled with its distinct method and analysis of language, propositions and statement and clearly defined terms gives analytic tradition a powerful spread in continental Europe. But it is difficult to attribute these qualities to continental philosophy in the strict sense of it.

Another problem that resonated during the Second World War was one between two belligerent rivals but regrettably philosophers who unsavourily engaged themselves to demarcate an edging line between analytic and the continental thinking. Chakraborty maintained that this division was portrayed from a historical, cultural, and geographical background and that it strengthened the division between analytic and continental from the prospect of methodology (Chakraborty, 2015:120). The history of Western philosophy shared from this kind of division in the sense that there is a sharp division between Eastern and Western, Ancient versus Medieval versus Modern, Kantian versus neo-Kantian etc. These sharp divide equally featured heavily in the hot debate between analytic and continental down to idealism and metaphysical principles. Thus, it follows that thinkers guided by clarification, reason, impartiality, reflective thoughts, integrity and desire and who assimilates new perspective can be regarded as philosophers (Chakraborty 2015: 120).

THE GEO-LINGUISTIC TWIST IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Glock started by saying that geo-linguistic conception of analytic philosophy can be defined by reference to Anglo-Americans or Anglo-Saxon or English-speaking philosophers. Drummet (1993) maintained that analytic philosophy is distinguished from other schools of thought by its philosophical account of thought which can be attained through a philosophical account of language

and through this method; a comprehensive account of things can be achieved. He argued that the linguistic turn is the methodological strategy of an entire philosophical school and that the only route to the analysis of thought is through the analysis of language.

From the perspective of geo-linguistic conception, analytic philosophy tremendously prevailed in several decades in the English-speaking world and its ascendancy in Germanophone countries has made significant inroads even in countries once regarded as hostile to the movement such as France. According to Sluga (1980:2) it was Frege who took philosophy of language as the basic idea of analytic philosophy and the foundation of all the rest of philosophy. Earlier on Dummett had argued that analytic philosophy can be conceived as that tradition which follows Frege's conception of philosophy of language and which has turned out to be the kernel and the central theme of analytic philosophy and the foundation of the rest of the subject (Dummett, 1978:441). From Dummett viewpoint, it can be said that analytic philosophy was born when the linguistic turn was taken as part and parcel of philosophy in German-speaking countries. For instance, the term language-analytic philosophy is often used for analytic philosophy.

Meanwhile, there have been controversies between Hacker and Dummett over which philosopher brought about the linguistic turn in philosophy. Hacker maintained that it was only Wittgenstein who brought the linguistic turn to philosophy and not Russell or Moore and that linguistic turn took place before the emergence of analytic philosophy.

But Glock's analysis of Wittgenstein's linguistic twist signifies that language is not just a secondary manifestation of something non-linguistic (Glock, 2012:35). Thoughts are neither mental process nor abstract entities, but themselves propositions, sentences which have been projected onto reality (2012: 35). Glock explained further that 'thoughts can be completely expressed in language, and philosophy can establish the limits of thoughts by establishing the limits of the linguistic expression of thought'. (2012:35). In other words, the limits of thought can only be drawn in language.

What is unique with Glock's work is his ability to demonstrate the relationship and influence of geography and language on analytic philosophy. According to Pincock, it was Glock who showed that geographic location of every philosophy and the analysis of language are central to the nature of analytic philosophy and that there is no need to separate philosophy from science (Pincock 2008:6). Therefore, the relationship and influence of geography and language on analytic tradition is significant and it is worth stressing here that geography and language influence different versions of analytic philosophy and assisted philosophers define the terms they use.

Glock did not stop there but went further to say that Anglo-centric type of analytic philosophy reveals little similarity to those of continental philosophy. This means that what stands as continental

philosophy may as well stand as Anglo-centric philosophy and as such both can influence each other. This may as well depend on who is viewing it and the school of thought involved. Glock and some other renowned thinkers associated with analytic philosophy and German speakers echoed the fact that philosophical thought and writings became official after being published in German language. This gives effect to the influence of geo-linguistic turn witnessed in the development of analytic philosophy. J.S Mill for example, acknowledges the huge German influence on analytic philosophy and on continental philosophy. Although Mill illuminated the difference between German kind of philosophizing and French kind of philosophizing, however, Mill like Glock was of the view that both philosophies and philosophers influences each other.

Glock also highlighted the fact that majority of recent commentators on what is analytic philosophy did not accept the simple-minded approach of the geo-linguistic contribution to analytic philosophy. To him, analytic philosophy will lose its value if philosophers who are thorough going analytic philosophers are replaced with philosophers who are not analytic philosophers in the strict sense of the word. The truth of this assertion will be a research of another time.

Another crucial development in Glock's analysis is the revolution on rigour which contributed immensely to the emergence of analytic philosophy. Glock revealed that the crucial role played by mathematics and logic in the emergence of analytic philosophy was huge and that such contribution made a worldwide impact so much so that it influence the precursor of American pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, to reintroduce the quantifier variable notation independently of Frege. Further contributions in this area were witnessed in the logic of relations making logic the kernel of analytic philosophy. It is argued that logic, science and mathematics greatly helped the development of geo-linguistic twist in analytic philosophy in the Continental Europe.

Another milestone here is the effect of logical positivism on analytic philosophy in the Continent of Europe. Logical positivism contributed to the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy particularly in Germanophone philosophy. It influenced the philosophical school of the last one hundred years, which greatly impacted on American philosophical tradition (Feigl 1981:57-94; Haller 1992:1). For instance, Hacker argued that the linguistic turn that occurred in the 1920s was preceded by a logistic turn that took place in the mid-nineteenth century, prior to the rise of analytic philosophy and that linguistic turn is in fact a phase in the development of analytic philosophy (Hacker 2013: 45).

Apart from the rapid spread of analytic tradition, logical positivism gained currency in Europe and in the US. Glock informed that logical positivism helped in the development of an indigenous form of logically minded empiricism derived from American pragmatism (Glock: 2008.69). For example,

logical positivism became a household name among scientists with instrumentalists or operationalist tendencies..

Although analytic philosophy and analytic philosophers received serious persecution and hostility especially in Germany, it did not stop the spread of analytic philosophy. Logical positivism held sway both in Europe and America and influenced many philosophers and scientists in their philosophical writings.

Glock went further to present a geo-linguistics version of analytic philosophy which articulates the contrast between Anglophone and Germanophone, and a contrast between analytic and continental philosophy. Specifically, this version focuses on Anglo-Austrian Analytic Axis (Simons 1986). The Anglo-Austrian axis comprises the British on one hand and the Habsburg Empire i.e. Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland on the other hand. The Anglo-Austrian analytic axis of philosophy is a radicalized version and markedly differs greatly from the rest of Germanophone philosophy in that it has no connection with Kantian philosophical tradition, but that of Bolzano (2004). The Anglo-Austrian analytic axis is also characterized by its rejection of all aspect of idealism in favour of psychological and linguistic analysis.

Bolzano and Brentano (1982) contributed to the geo-linguistic influence of Anglo-Austrian axis of analytic philosophy. For example, Bolzano and Brentano disassociated themselves from Kantian philosophy especially on issues that borders on the definition of truth and on the issues of analytic/synthetic distinction. Both Bolzano and Brentano treated German idealists with contempt and further express their dissatisfaction with German idealism which has dominated German philosophy since 18th century. However, their philosophies were radically different from that of the German Neo-Kantian philosophy. However, proponents of Anglo-Austrian conception of analytic philosophy insisted that the relevant contributions to analytic philosophy came from German scientists and mathematicians and not German philosophers.

The geo-linguistic conceptions contributed largely to the rapid development of analytic tradition in France. After the World-War II, the ascendancy of analytic philosophy overwhelmingly took the centre stage in most centres of Anglophone philosophy. Its dramatic improvement did not hamper other philosophical traditions like phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics and post-structuralism from taking roots in America and Ireland or the New School for Social Research in New York (Glock 2008:82)

PITFALLS OF GEO-LINGUISTIC CONCEPTION

The geo-linguistic conceptions failed because it did not neatly fit into either the analytic or the continental category. Its demise continued with the apparent deep division within the analytic philosophy. The division was between ideal language and ordinary language camp, and over the nature of language and meaning on one hand, and over how to do philosophy on the other hand. With this problem, analytic philosophy was no longer seen as the transparent phenomenon that the early analyst had taken it to be in the real sense of the word. In fact linguistic meaning turn out to be a puzzling phenomenon that need deep philosophical treatment.

CONCLUSION.

To conclude, analytic philosophy is a process that concentrates on the analysis of language for the purpose of attaining comprehensive philosophical thought and revolves around the logical clarification of thoughts, and helps philosophers define the terms they use. Analytic tradition insist that there are no specifically philosophical truths and that the logical clarification of thoughts can only be attained by analysis of the logical form of philosophical propositions Analytic tradition abhors sweeping philosophical systems and grand theories and gives attention to details and come in defence of common sense and ordinary language in rejection to traditional metaphysics.

It is also relevant to the extent that philosophy should apply logical techniques or logical programme in order to attain conceptual clarity. It influenced the logical positivists, the pragmatists, and other philosophies like empiricism, rationalism, existentialism, phenomenology etc. The contribution to analytic tradition of the logical positivists is that they started to develop a new sort of conceptual analysis through logic and analysis of language which made analytic philosophy receive new world-view. Analytic philosophy from Glock's understanding is a break from the past, a past which tends to be uniform and predominantly misguided. He maintained that the past and present tendencies cut across all geographical and linguistic boundaries. This in effect pitches the geo-linguistic conception of analytic philosophy as being misguided. He criticised continental philosophy as a misnomer and that analytic philosophy had strong ties with continental Europe at its earlier stage but later separated itself from continental tradition. Glock therefore contends that the geo-linguistic view of the analytic/continental divide is wrong in nearly every possible way. Through a very persuasive argument he rejects the story of the British origins of analytic philosophy and the Anglo-Austrian origins tale told by Neurath and Haller (1991) to be incomplete and misguided and that analytic philosophy does not contrast so much with French or German philosophy, as with romanticism, irrationalism, and existentialism. A devastating blow from other philosophers on analytic philosophy is that it is ahistorical but Glock was not perturbed by this criticism rather quipped that analytic

approach to history is a very weak one and agreed that analytic philosophy focuses on solving and dissolving philosophical problems. 637

Finally, analytic philosophy is relevant and a significant feature to philosophical problems because of its turn away from the method of doing philosophy and its proposed grand systems or broad syntheses and its turn toward precision and attention to detail. It is basically characterized above all by the goal of clarity, the insistence on explicit argumentation in philosophy, and the demand that any view expressed in philosophy or science be exposed to the rigours of critical evaluation, and exactness of language of analysis and discussion by philosophers.

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